Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

  • April 30, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    Pop quiz: What is the central constitutional provision at issue in the Supreme Court’s review of the Affordable Care Act? If you said the Commerce Clause, you’re one step ahead of many of the tea partiers who protested outside the Supreme Court during oral arguments.

    Responding to questions from staff at the Constitutional Accountability Center, tea partiers bearing signs that read “Obamacare is unconstitutional” couldn’t name any part of the Constitution that they believe the law violates.

    “Well, I should know better. I should be able to answer that question and I can’t,” said one protester in a video produced by CAC, “Tea Party vs. The Constitution: ObamaCare Edition.”

    “If you read the Constitution, there’s nothing in there about health care,” said another.

    Others, when told that the Commerce Clause is what authorized Congress to pass the law, said the Commerce Clause was “added later” and was not part of the original Constitution.

    And when the interviewer tried to correct them by pointing out that the Commerce Clause is in Article 1, Section 8 of the original Constitution, one protester responded, “There’s no use in arguing about that because I don’t think either of us know for sure.”

    Watch the full video, including facts from experts who know what the Constitution actually says, below:

  • March 30, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Rebecca L. Brown, Newton Professor of Constitutional Law at the USC Gould School of Law


    During Tuesday’s argument, Justice Scalia asked whether the individual mandate, even if “necessary,” was also “proper.” He may well have had good reasons to focus on this language, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to which it refers.

    In 2005, Justice Scalia wrote separately in a Commerce Clause case to emphasize that conduct can be regulated if it is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity….”  He added, “where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.” The question in the case, Gonzales v. Raich, was whether the federal drug laws could reach the cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal use as authorized by state law. Justice Scalia wrote that, when the federal government puts in place a comprehensive regulatory scheme that falls within the power to regulate interstate commerce (such as the interstate drug laws) then it may also impose additional requirements, even over matters that it could not regulate in isolation (such as wholly intrastate, non-commercial activity, like the growing of marijuana)—if those additional requirements are “necessary and proper” to effectuate the larger federal scheme.   

    Many of us read that plausible analysis to suggest an analogous approach to the Affordable Care Act. Congress has unquestioned authority to regulate the interstate and commercial matters of health care and insurance. In turn, as Justice Scalia made clear in Raich, additional rules that are necessary and proper to the functioning of the overall system of regulating those markets can be constitutionally adopted by Congress-- even if those additional rules might be of questionable validity if passed in isolation. 

    There is no dispute that the individual mandate is necessary, even essential, to effectuate the congressional policy of requiring insurers to offer coverage without regard to pre-existing conditions. Without the individual mandate, people would be free to wait to buy insurance until they needed expensive medical care, which would undercut the role of insurance as a pooling of risk. Assuming, then, that Justice Scalia would maintain consistency with his prior views, many thought that he could be counted on as a vote to uphold the individual mandate.

    But, apparently realizing the import of his prior opinion, Justice Scalia on Tuesday laid the groundwork for backing away from it. While conceding that the individual mandate is “necessary” to the federal scheme, he questioned whether it is also “proper.” Why might it not be proper? In an exercise of utterly circular reasoning, Justice Scalia suggested that it might not be “proper” because it goes beyond the limits of Congress’s limited powers.   

  • March 26, 2012

    The Following is an excerpt from Harvard Law Professor Charles Fried’s testimony during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.* Prof. Fried was former solicitor general under President Ronald Reagan. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments on the Affordable Care Act.


    I come here today not as a partisan supporter of the Obama Administration’s health care legislation. I am not an expert in health care economics or policy, and I am sure there are many arguments for and against the wisdom and feasibility of this legislation. I do not enter into that debate. I am an expert on constitutional law, which I have been teaching and practicing for many years and on which I have written books and articles, most to the point my 2004 book, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. I also am not one who believes that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution is in effect a grant of power to Congress to regulate anything it wishes in any way it pleases. There are limits to what may plausibly be called commerce. I agree entirely with the decision in United States v. Morrison that section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act cannot be brought within Congress’s power to regulate commerce. Indeed I sat at counsel table with Michael Rosman when he successfully argued that case. Though gender-motivated violence is despicable, cowardly, and in every state in the union criminal, a man beating up his wife or girlfriend is not commerce. Neither is carrying a gun in or near a school, as the Court correctly held in United States v. Lopez. The arguments to the contrary required torturing not only constitutional law but the English language. But the business of insurance is commerce. That’s what the Supreme Court decided in 1944 in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n and the law has not departed from that conclusion for a moment since then. One need only think of the massive regulation of insurance that is represented by ERISA to see how deep and unquestioned is that conclusion.

    If insurance is commerce, then of course the business of health insurance is commerce. It insures an activity that represents nearly 18% of the United States economy. (In this connection recall Perez v. United States, which held that a very local loan sharking operation was within Congress’s power to regulate commerce.) And if health insurance is commerce, then the health care mandate is a regulation of commerce, explicitly authorized by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

  • March 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Sara Rosenbaum, Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments on the Affordable Care Act. 


    When the curtain rises on the Affordable Care Act arguments before the United States Supreme Court, the nation will be fully engaged in what is perhaps the most important legal examination in generations regarding Congress’s constitutional powers to tackle issues of unsurpassed social and economic concern. Although Chief Justice Roberts has likened the role of the courts to that of an umpire in a baseball game, one can hope that the Justices will view the case for its broader significance for the health care system as a whole, as well as for the 32 million children and adults whose access to health insurance rests great measure in their hands. A declaration that the Act is unconstitutional will not merely nullify its provisions. Under federal budgeting principles, it will effectively roll the federal health reform spending baseline back to zero. The likelihood that Congress will, anytime soon, find the $1.5 trillion needed to make coverage affordable for nearly all Americans is slim to nil, something that the Act’s opponents frankly are banking on.

    It was perhaps inevitable that health care would be the issue to trigger a full-throated debate over the constitutional relationship between the federal government and American society. The signature domestic policy achievement of the Obama Administration, the Act stands as a testament to lawmakers’ ability to devise national solutions that simultaneously weave a wide array of existing laws – Medicaid for the poorest Americans, tax subsidies for low and moderate income individuals and families, and federal laws that regulate the behavior of insurers in the marketplace – into a complex legislative intervention of universal scope and impact.

  • March 22, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Timothy Jost, a law professor at Washington and Lee University. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments on the Affordable Care Act.


    As we approach the oral arguments before the Supreme Court the week of March 26, most attention has focused on the constitutionality of the minimum coverage requirement. The question of whether or not Congress had the authority to impose this requirement under its delegated powers to regulate interstate commerce, levy taxes, and enact necessary and proper laws has been the focus of Affordable Care Act ligation since the day the law was enacted.

    Yet the Court will also hear arguments on an even more important issue — whether the ACA’s expansion of the Medicaid program is constitutional. The Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal and state government and administered by the states subject to federal guidelines. It was begun in 1965 as a program to cover poor aged, blind, and disabled persons and families with dependent children. Medicaid has expanded over the years to cover more lower-income Americans. The ACA expands it once again, this time to cover adults with incomes at or below 133 percent of poverty beginning on January 1, 2014.