Surveillance

  • January 24, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Micah W.J. Smith, an associate at O’Melveny and Myers, and Babak Siavoshy, a teaching fellow at UC Berkeley’s Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic. Siavoshy was part of the legal team that represented Antoine Jones while an associate at O’Melveny and Myers, and has not worked on the case in his capacity at UC Berkeley. 


    In June of last year, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and one of his law clerks wrote a eulogy for the Fourth Amendment, in which they mournfully concluded that “[w]ith so little left private, the Fourth Amendment is all but obsolete.” With the benefit of hindsight, it seems the eulogy may have been premature. On Monday, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Jones, and unanimously held that the government violated Antoine Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights by surreptitiously monitoring his vehicle’s movements on public roads for four weeks. The Court’s decision is a ringing endorsement of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark of liberty — and of the Amendment’s relevance to the surveillance technologies of the twenty-first century.

    As members of Antoine Jones’s legal team in the Supreme Court, we thought we’d offer a few thoughts on the case and its implications. Given the significant amount of commentary that is already available on the blogosphere, we won’t dwell too much on the details. (For readers interested in a more granular analysis, we recommend Tom Goldstein’s post at SCOTUSblog. Or Orin Kerr’s several posts at The Volokh Conspiracy. For readers interested in a broader overview, try Adam Liptak’s article in The New York Times.)

    Prior to Jones, there were good reasons to believe the Fourth Amendment was dying. Since the Court decided Katz v. United States over forty years ago, the Amendment’s protections were commonly understood to apply only when the government intruded on a person’s subjective expectation of privacy that society would deem reasonable. The Court had never explicitly overruled earlier cases that pinned the Fourth Amendment to founding-era property concepts, but any commentator familiar with LaFave’s authoritative treatises would have been tempted to conclude that those cases had lost their vitality, or were, in legal jargon, no longer “good law.”

    The problem was that at the same time it took on Fourth Amendment primacy, privacy was losing some of its power. This was in part because new and fast-changing technologies — think smart phones, sophisticated data mining techniques, and Google — were at once making our lives more and more convenient and less and less private. It was also perhaps because a new generation of Americans has come of age with Twitter and Facebook and YouTube, and many of us now have a much more complicated relationship with privacy. It’s a relationship that takes for granted that privacy might flourish even in public places, and even in information that has been shared with some people but not everyone. And it’s a relationship the law has been too quick to paint as a lack of any privacy at all.

  • January 23, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    The U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously today that police must obtain a warrant before placing a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car.

    The ruling in U.S. v. Jones invalidates the life sentence of Antoine Jones, who was convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine using evidence obtained over the course of a month from a GPS device attached to Jones’ Jeep Grand Cherokee.

    The justices split on the rationale, with a five-justice majority led by Antonin Scalia holding that the attachment of the GPS device to the car was a physical intrusion requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.

    “That ruling avoided many difficult questions, including how to treat information gathered from devices installed by the manufacturer and how to treat information held by third parties like cellphone companies,” explains The New York Times’ Adam Liptak.

    The four-justice minority, led by Samuel Alito, said that the prolonged time period of the surveillance – a month long – amounted to a search and called the majority’s narrow holding “unwise.”

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who adopted the majority’s rationale, also wrote her own concurring opinion, in which she asserts that event non-physical intrusions might constitute warrantless searches, before concluding that the court need not answer those questions in this case.

    “She makes it clear that she sides with those that see a problem with electronic surveillance too,” writes Marcy Wheeler for emptywheel.

    Wheeler continues:

  • January 5, 2012
    BookTalk
    The Odd Clauses
    Understanding the Constitution Through Ten of Its Most Curious Provisions
    By: 
    Jay Wexler

    By Jay Wexler, a law professor at Boston University School of Law.


    When I first sat down to write The Odd Clauses — my new book about ten of the Constitution’s lesser known but still-pretty-important provisions — probably the hardest question I faced was which clauses to include. This, in turn, forced me to confront the question of what makes an odd clause odd? Are the oddest clauses those that nobody has ever heard of? Those that are historically anachronistic? Those that seem to deal with topics — post roads, perhaps? — that seem somehow beneath the dignity of a constitution?

    In the end, after many late-night boozy breathless conversations about the meaning of constitutional oddness (not really), I decided that, for me, what makes a clause odd is its specificity. The clauses that I find oddly compelling are those — like the Incompatibility Clause, which prohibits members of Congress from simultaneously holding executive office, or the Letters of Marque Clause, which gives Congress the power to authorize private ships to fight pirates on the government’s behalf  —that perform or illustrate key constitutional functions or values (separation of powers, for instance, or allocating power over foreign affairs) in very specific, and therefore (to me, anyway), quirky and odd ways.

    Under this definition, the Recess Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”) qualifies as odd, and I therefore included it as the subject of Chapter Three of my book (illustrating presidential powers). But at the same time, I realized that in many other ways the clause is not all that odd — people have generally heard about it, and it’s played an important role historically — and so it was no surprise that of all the clauses I discuss in the book, the Recess Appointments Clause is the first to make front page news. (By contrast, the notion that Senator Scott Brown might be violating the Incompatibility Clause by remaining in the National Guard has made front page news only in my own head.)

    For the past month or so, speculation ran rampant as to whether President Obama would use his recess appointment power to appoint Richard Cordray as the first head of the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Republicans refused to confirm Cordray unless major changes to the law creating the new agency that are unappealing to the President were implemented, and so a recess appointment had been the President’s only option. To stop the President from taking this step, Republican senators decided to hold pro-forma sessions every three days since leaving for the holidays (Democrats, incidentally, did a similar thing at the end of the Bush Administration), relying on past governmental pronouncements that in order to qualify as a “recess,” the Senate must be on break for at least three days. 

    Originally, some speculated that President Obama might appoint Cordray during the imaginary moment on January 3 when the previous session of Congress ended and the new one began, following the example of Teddy Roosevelt, who pulled such a maneuver (to much criticism) back in 1903. Instead, Obama waited until January 4, when he exercised his more typical recess appointment power to install Cordray as the head of the new agency without Senate approval, on the theory that the Republicans’ pro-forma sessions do not render what otherwise would be a recess a recess, for purposes of the Constitution.

    Republicans are, of course, up in arms, threatening to challenge the President’s exercise of power in court. It is likely that a court — maybe even the Supreme Court — will one day weigh in on whether the President exceeded his power under the Recess Appointments Clause. Do pro-forma meetings count as real Senate sessions? 

  • December 20, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Sahar Aziz, an associate professor of law at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law and a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. This is a cross-post from The Huffington Post.


    On the same day that Rep. Peter King held the fourth "homegrown terrorism" hearing focused exclusively on Muslims, the White House released its Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. Despite the White House's seemingly benign approach to counterterrorism, its implementation produces adverse effects similar to Mr. King's confrontational tactics.

    The White House Strategy proclaims, "Law enforcement and government officials for decades have understood the critical importance of building relationships, based on trust, with the communities they serve. Partnerships are vital to address a range of challenges and must have as their foundation a genuine commitment on the part of law enforcement and government to address community needs and concerns, including protecting rights and public safety."

    To someone unfamiliar with the history of community outreach to American Muslims, the strategy sounds ideal. However, the Obama Administration has sabotaged its own high-minded public position by adopting the Bush Administration's counterterrorism model that punishes the broad Muslim community rather than targeting genuine threats. Thus, the Administration's actual practices conform all-too-closely to Peter King's vision of terrorism being synonymous with Islam.

    While preventing terrorism before it happens is a legitimate strategy, the way in which it is currently implemented comes at a high price to a vulnerable minority -- Muslims in America.

  • November 17, 2011
    BookTalk
    Unpopular Privacy
    What Must We Hide?
    By: 
    Anita L. Allen

    By Anita L. Allen, a law and philosophy professor at the University of Pennsylvania.


    An expanding library of books addresses the fate of privacy in the Era of Revelation. The central theme of my contribution to the genre sets it apart. My book’s focus is “unpopular” privacy, rather than the “popular” privacy people in the United States, Canada and Europe tend to want and expect government to secure. I define as “unpopular” privacy that is unwanted, disliked, not preferred, and resented by the people it is suppose to benefit or constrain.

    Testing the plausibility ofprivacy paternalism for liberal societies, I engage readers in a wide-ranging discussion of physical privacies of seclusion, isolation, and bodily exposure; and then informational privacies of confidentiality and data protection. Specifically, under the rubric of unwanted physical privacies, I discuss nude dancing, Muslim attire, public health quarantine and super max prison cells; under informational privacies, I take up whether “race” counts as sensitive data, the confidentiality obligations of lawyers, health care providers and other workers, electronic social networking, and online commerce and self-exposure.

    Should youthful Internet users be blocked from websites that collect sensitive personal information, for their own good? Should the law oblige us to forego Amazon.com since the giant consumer goods seller keeps track of our purchases and makes recommendations, or gmail because it pitches ads to us based on words that appear in our private messages to family and friends? Should adults with intimate secrets be banned from publishing them? Is there a possible justification for laws that ban Apps that monitor and store health information in the “cloud”?  

    Unpopular Privacy explores the normative underpinnings of laws that promote, require, and enforce physical and informational privacies. My book struggles to understand the values that prompt real and imagined unpopular privacy mandates.  Persuading libertarians and feminists with whom I identify to endorse regimes of imposed privacy is a significant intellectual challenge; both groups famously caution against the subordinating potential of compulsory privacies.